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Abstract
The Treaty on European Union (EU) has on the one hand increased democratic legitimacy of the
integration process by confering new powers to the European Parliament (EP) - legitimacy viewed
as an attribute-, while on the other hand acceptance by the citizens - legitimacy conceived as
orientation - dropped considerably after Maastricht. This situation hints at a paradox and highlights
the need for a more complex approach to the issue of legitimacy of the EU and the role played by
the EP.
As a first step, we identify different views on the role of the European Parliament: a federalist and a
realist one. Further, they are contrasted with empirical findings about the role and function of the
EP after Maastricht, using three main dimensions: policy-making, system-development and
interaction with the citizens. Taking into account the results of this inquiry, we present a new
perspective on the EP based upon a view of the EU as a new kind of political system characterised
by fusion. It is a major feature of this new kind of political system that national, subnational and
supranational actors merge their instruments to 'produce' political decisions.
The result is a mixed polity whose legitimacy is neither based on a collective personality called 'the
people' nor on the single peoples of the member states only, but on a 'pluralistic citizenship' as a
'unity-in diversity'. Legitimacy as an attribute must be defined in new terms deviant from national
experiences, entailing - at least partly - a lack of transparency, increasing complexity and growing
differentiation. Is Legitimacy possible despite these apparant drawbacks? This question hints at an
ambiguous, but also 'productive' tension within the EU system as a whole and with regard to the
role and position of the EP in particular. 
Kurzfassung
Der Vertrag über die Europäische Union (EUV) hat einerseits die demokratische Legitimität des
Integrationsprozesses durch die Übertragung neuer Kompetenzen an das Europäische Parlament
(EP) - Legitimität verstanden als Attribut (des politischen Systems der EU) - gestärkt, während
andererseits die öffentliche Akzeptanz - Legitimität verstanden als Orientierung (der Bürgerinnen
und Bürger) - seit Maastricht deutlich nachgelassen hat. Diese Situation deutet auf ein Paradox hin
und unterstreicht die Notwendigkeit eines komplexeren Verständnisses des Themas der
"Legitimität der EU" und der Rolle des EP.
In einem ersten Schritt identifizieren wir unterschiedliche Konzeptionen der Rolle des EP: eine
föderalistisch inspirierte und eine intergouvernemental orientierte Sichtweise. Anschließend werden
diesen beiden Konzeptionen die Rolle und Funktionen des EP nach Maastricht gegenübergestellt,
wobei drei Haupt-Dimensionen Beachtung finden: die Politikgestaltung, die Systementwicklung
und die Interaktion mit den Bürgerinnen und Bürgern. Unter Berücksichtigung der Ergebnisse
dieser Untersuchung präsentieren wir eine neue Sichtweise des EP, die auf der Annahme beruht,
daß die EU ein neuartiges politisches System darstellt, welches durch den Prozeß der Fusion
gekennzeichnet werden kann. Ein wesentliches Kennzeichen dieses Systems besteht darin, daß
nationale, supranationale und subnationale Akteure ihre Instrumente zur Herstellung, Durchführung
und Kontrolle politischer Entscheidungen "verschmelzen". 
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auf einem einzigen Kollektiv, genannt das "Volk", noch auf den einzelnen Völkern der
Mitgliedstaaten allein beruht, sondern auf einer "pluralistischen Bürgerschaft", im Sinne einer
"Einheit-in-Vielfalt". Legitimität als Attribut des politischen Systems der EU muß in Begriffen
definiert werden, die von den nationalen Erfahrungen abstrahieren, wobei - zumindest teilweise -
ein Defizit an Transparenz, eine erhöhte Komplexität und eine steigende Differenzierung in Kauf
genommen werden müssen. Ist Legitimität trotz dieser offensichtlichen Mängel möglich? Diese
Frage offenbart eine mehrdeutige, aber auch produktive Spannung innerhalb des EU-Systems
insgesamt und in bezug auf die Rolle und Funktionen des EP im besonderen.
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1
Each generation describes what it sees,
but it uses words transmitted from the past.
Walter Bagehot
I. Starting from a paradox: political and academic relevance
1. Increase in political power - decrease in public support
The issue of legitimacy plays a significant role in western political systems; interestingly, it reveals a
special importance if related to the European Union (EU), arousing heated debates among politicians
and scholars. From a functional or technocratic point of view it could be argued that legitimacy is
delivered by the success of problem-solving and does not need further justification. But evidence in
the EC/EU shows that this concept does not go far enough. Whereas in other international
organizations the question of legitimacy has never seriously been raised - e.g. in NATO - in the EU
things are different; it seems that the special case of the EC/EU, where increasingly political
decisions on the use of state and state-like instruments are transfered to a supranational level in
which the nation-states lose - at least partly - autonomous rights of decision-making, adds a further
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the loss of hitherto familiar mechanisms of legitimation in the national context require explanation
and justification. 
But one should also have other western political systems in mind when touching upon questions of
legitimacy, in order to identify similarities or divergencies. Legitimacy crises can be observed in
nearly all major western countries, to a certain extent also in the USA. So one question could be: Is
the the EU an exceptional case or simply one example of a broader development that affects societies
of modern service and welfare states? 
In all democratic systems, Parliaments are considered to be strongholds and symbols of legitimacy;
as directly elected bodies they represent national citizenship and act on its behalf. In the case of the
EU, although partly resorting to the attributes and symbols of its national counterparts, differences
are striking. The European Parliament is not a legislative assembly shaped according its sisters and
brothers in the member countries of the Union. Nevertheless, and from whatever angle it is
approached, it seems to have a symbolic importance as far as legitimacy of the integration process is
concerned. Its capacity to fulfil its functions and to deliver a kind of 'European legitimacy' depend to
a large extent upon the character of the system of the EU as a whole and the special role it plays
within it.
The Treaty on European Union has, without any doubt, strengthened the position and role of the
European Parliament within the system of the European Union. Despite this reduction of the
democratic deficit, developments after the conclusion of the TEU have led to a loss of public support
and made the project of integration more contested than ever within the Member States; the public
discourse after Maastricht seems to have weakened the legitimacy of the Union (Telò 1995: 18).
This paradox hints at different perspectives from which legitimacy can be defined. While legitimacy
understood as an attribute of the political system of the EU has been strengthened, legitimacy as an
orientation among the citizens has decreased. A tension between both dimensions of legitimacy has
since Maastricht been one of the characteristics of the development of the integration process.
It also highlights the loss of validity of an equation that for quite a long time dominated the political
and academic debate synthesized by the formula: democratization means parliamentarization of the
EU. Neither introducing direct election nor enhancing the competencies of the European Parliament
as such will strengthen democratic legitimacy. Increasing democracy and legitimacy of the Union
requires a multi-dimensional approach that takes the peculiar nature of the EU into account.
2
2. On our approach: How to grasp an institution within an evolutionary system
As a first step, we identify different views on the role and position of the EP and the EU as a whole.
We distinguish roughly between a federal and an interstate (realist) conception of the EP, sketching
the outlines of each of them. Further, they are contrasted with empirical findings about the actual role
and function of the EP. This empirical analysis is guided by a dynamic approach taking into account
the evolutionary character of the EU-system. Finally, and taking into account the results of our
enquiry, we will try to present a new perspective on the EP that differs both from the federalist as
well as from the interstate (realist) paradigm and is based upon a view of the EU as a new kind of
political system (Wessels 1996).
Generally, this study tries to relate the European Parliament to a macro-level concept of legitimacy as
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democratic deficit and assuming new competencies and powers. One question that can be posed is
about the importance of the EP in relation with the legitimacy of the EU as a whole, and the way the
nature of the EU system affects this context.
3. A revised set of parliamentary functions
The classical pattern of parliamentary functions as originally described by Walter Bagehot and
developed by Steffani and others cannot be considered as an adequate analytical framework of our
research. Instead, we prefer a set of functions that corresponds to the special features of the EU
system.
As a crucial condition we need to pursue a dynamic approach by which the performance of the
European Parliament can be measured according to three different functions that reflect the
peculiarity of the EC/EU-system and try to adapt parliamentary functions to a moving political
context. We take as indicators (Bourguignon-Wittke et al. 1985; Grabitz et al. 1988; Wessels 1995):
the policy-making function of the EP, which means the influence exerted by the EP in the
EU-policy cycle in relation with the Council and the Commission, i.e. its ability to participate
in the preparation, making and implementation and control of decisions produced by the
EC/EU system. It also includes the elective function with regard to the investiture of the
Commission; 
the system-development function, which refers to its ability to participate at constitutive
decisions and at shaping the functional, sectorial and geographical scope of the political
system; 
the interaction function with the public and the citizens, which touches upon its ability to be
perceived, appreciated and supported by the public.
II. Traditional Dogmas about the European Parliament
We do not claim nor pretend that the schools of thought sketched below are represented or defended
in their ideal-type version by anyone, but they can serve as orientation points offering different angles
from which the EU and its legitimacy can be approached.
3
1. The federalist view
In this concept, legitimacy rests first and foremost upon the citizens of Europe or even the European
people (Spinelli 1958), which gradually develop a kind of European identity as complementary to
their national, regional and local orientations.
By the election of a Parliament they freely express their will and determine in an unfiltered way
decision-making in the EU (Schneider 1986); for federalists, the way should go into the direction of a
state-like polity, a 'parliamentary Europe' (Duff 1995) or even a 'supranational parliamentary
democracy' (Laming 1995: 117). The role of the EP could be shaped in correspondance to the
Westminster Model, which means that its functions might in the long run resemble that of national
parliaments. 
In the field of policy-making, there would be the election and control of the Commission as a
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representing the member states, as well as representation and articulation of political currents
organized through and within European parties (Schneider 1986; Spinelli 1958). 
The European Parliament would also, by giving its assent to all important constitutional matters,
become one of the motors of system-development in the EU; its interaction with the citizens would
step by step replace connections with national parliaments. In a virtuous circle, all these powers and
capabilities would reinforce each other.
Graph 1
The federalist view holds that the interest of the citizens and their support for integration continues to
increase, in neo-functionalist terms labelled as a "shift of loyalties" (Haas 1968). The EP is regarded
as the main legitimizing factor of the EU system. Its role in EU policies has to be enhanced, thus
attracting people's interest in Parliament and the EU as a whole. The direct elections, introduced in
1979, are considered as an essential step forwards in order to shape the EP according to its national
counterparts, and must be followed by an increase in its power and competencies. 
Table 1
According to this perspective, the democratic deficit of the existing EU is caused by an undervalued
role of the EP as a directly elected, democratic element of representation. The more the EU is
assuming competencies, Parliament should correspondingly be endowed with relevant powers
(Naßmacher 1972: 76f.). The democratic deficit of the EU can thus precisely be defined as " the shift
in decision-making powers from the national to the EU level, without accompanying strengthening of
parliamentary control of executive bodies" (Archer/Butler 1996: 58). In this sense, the lack of control
over governments firstly on the national and secondly on the European levels creates a "double
democratic deficit" (Lodge 1996: 190f.) 
Furthermore, a factor that inhibits citizens from identifying themselves with the Union, is the lacking
transparency of the system; in that respect, too, the European Parliament has a fundamental role:
"The EC's institutions were not, and are not, tangible and intellegible to voters. The one institution
traditionally seen as capable of engendering popular belief in its own and the EC/EU's democratic
legitimacy, the European Parliament, suffered from the outset from being a marginal player in the
system. The mere fact of it having been directly elected was not and is not enough to generate the
democratic consent needed to give EC authority structures legitimacy yet" (Lodge 1996: 189f.).
A European constitution would serve as a fundamental political charter and a focus of identification
(Weidenfeld 1996; Läufer 1995); European values and interests will gain force and strengthen the
emotional links between the citizens and the EU system. The nation-states will not be removed, but
play a minor role in the hierarchy of preferences of the citizens and the political forces.
2. A state-centred (realist) view
The realist view ascribes only a minor role to the European Parliament. As the German
Constitutional Court puts it, legitimacy is mainly secured by the peoples of the member states via
their nationally elected representative bodies, and only in a supplementary manner by the European
Parliament (Bundesverfassungsgericht 1993). The basic assumption is that there is no single
European people on which a European staatehood could be founded, not even a European public
space that would shape the will and opinion of the population. (Lübbe 1994; Kielmansegg 1996,
European Constitutional Group 1993). The European Parliament is seen as a marginal player, lacking
the quality and atrtributes of national representative assemblies considered as Parliaments in the 'full'
sense of the term (Schröder 1994; Lübbe 1994).
4 of 15 26.10.97 19:29
EIoP: Text 1997-006: Full text http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-006.htm4
Decision-making rests primarily upon the Council, system-development would be initiated by the
European Council which would also ensure the links of interaction between the national and the
Europaen levels.
Table 2
This school of thought describes quite a different kind of democratic dilemma. As the main and
essential source of legitimacy is the nation-state via its elected bodies, the EU is getting into a
'legitimacy trap': the more it assumes new competencies and exerts them through supranational
structures and procedures of decision-making, the less is it able to be regarded as legitimate, simply
because it is moving away from the sources of this legitimacy - the nation-state (Kielmansegg 1996).
Citizens will always cling to their used and familiar values and symbols, making nearly impossible to
develop a European identity. On the other hand, however, Europeanization might appear attractive
for reasons of efficiency. As Rolf Gustavsson puts it, "there is this fundamental dilemma: a choice
between a quasi-federalist option which probably provides more efficiency but weaker formal
democratic legitimacy and a confederalist option with less efficiency but stronger formal legitimacy"
(Gustavsson 1996: 226).
In contrast to the assumptions by the federalist school, this approach supposes a relationship between
the different functions of policy-making, system-development and interaction expressed in in a
vicious circle, i.e. lacking political power, incapability of changing the rules of the game, and little
public support reinforce each other in weakening the position of Parliament, reducing it to a marginal
player in the European arena.
Graph 2
III. The European Parliament after Maastricht - an Empirical
Assessment
Both models are state-oriented and cling to classical patterns of direct accountability between the
electorate and Parliament. The two alternative options seem to be that of either building up a state on
the European level or preserving it on the national level. The process of integration, however, cannot
be explained and shaped according to those concepts and terms taken from (national) statehood. An
innovative concept of the EU and the European Parliament should be used that takes the peculiar
nature of this political system into account. An empirical analysis of how the European Parliament
works would therefore be a first step to redefine its role and position within the EU-system. In the
following, we assess the changes that can be observed in recent years, especially after the coming
into force of the Treaty on European Union, according to our set of functions. Generally, the
Maastricht Treaty has introduced the following important changes concerning the role and position of
the European Parliament (Jacobs/Corbett/Shackelton 1992: 10):
co-decision procedure (Art. 189b TEC) 
extension of application of assent procedure to a wider range of international agreements (Art.
228 (3) TEC) and other sectors 
approval to the newly elected Commission (Art. 158 (2)) 
election of an Ombudsman (Art. 138 e TEC) 
installation of Committees of Inquiry (Art. 138c TEC) 
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1. Policy-making
Concerning decision-making in the EU, the EP has increased its role and position considerably,
especially with the introduction of the new procedure of Art. 189b TEC (co-decision). Here, the
European Parliament has the possibility to finally block any decision by the Council, i.e. it has an
nearly equal say at least in vetoing a judicial act, without being able, however, to enforce legislation
against resistance by the Council. In case of divergent positions, a conciliation committee composed
of members of the Council and the European Parliament tries to find a compromise. As Jacobs,
Corbett and Shackelton put it, "the right to say 'no' gives Parliament a bargaining position which it
has hitherto lacked regarding Community legislation, and is of fundamental importance to public
perception of Parliament's role - it can no longer be accused of lacking teeth" (Jacobs/ Corbett/
Shackelton 1992: 191). 
The enhanced role of the EP has not delayed or even paralyzed policy-making, on the contrary -
interaction with the Council proved to be rather successful. Since November 1993, i.e. the coming
into force of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), until March 1996, there have been 162 proposals
by the Commission based upon the co-decision procedure, of which 40 had been finally adopted. In
20 cases the Council requested the Conciliation Committee to be convoked. Only 2 cases were in the
end rejected by Parliament (Schmuck 1996). 
Further, an increasing use of co-decision (Art. 189b) instead of other legislative procedures within
the European Community, can be observed. In 1994, the European Parliament concluded 168
resolutions according to the consultation procedure, 54 based upon the cooperation procedure (Art.
189c TEC) and 60 under co-decision (Art. 189b TEC); in 11 cases it gave its assent. In 1995, the
respective figures were 164 (consultation), 38 (cooperation), 61 (co-decision) and 17 (assent).
Parliament is thus intensively using its new rights and competencies and is regarded as a reliable and
serious partner. The functioning of the co-decision procedure is assessed as satisfactory by the
Commission, hinting at the fact that the average duration is at 300 days, i.e. 10 months (Schmuck
1995; 1996).
A first step in the direction of an elective function was done with the assent of the EP to the new
Commission according to Art. 158 (2). The overall impression was that the EP's approval cannot be
regarded just as a formal act, a kind of 'nihil obstat', but was designed as a genuinely political
decision. The EP has set a clear signal that it insists on this right and regards it as an essential part of
its competencies. Organizing hearings with the candidates to the Commission, resembles at first sight
the procedure of the US Senate to confirm high political officials. Even where the European
Parliament did not have the formal right to approve a candidate - as in case of the President-designate
of the Commission - but is only consulted, it tries to offer a public forum for discussion and political
debate that can hardly be ignored by the member states. The investiture of Jacques Santer in 1995 has
given proof of this fact. Parliament is also consulted when appointing the President of the European
Monetary Institute and the President, the Vice-Presidents and the other members of the board of the
future European Central Bank (Art. 109f, 109l TEC and Art. 50 of the Statute of the European
Central Bank). It remains to be seen if the deputies will be able to add a political dimension to these
decisions and serve as a controlling authority. Jacobs, Corbett and Shackelton indulge in an
optimistic scenario on the influence of the European Parliament: "Although Parliament's role will
only be consultative, it is potentially crucial. As for other appointments where Parliament is
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surprising if that individual wished to take office should Parliament reject his or her candidacy... It is
therefore likely that the consultation of Parliament will amount, in practice, to a vote of confirmation
in which Parliament enjoys a virtual right of veto" (Jacobs/Corbett/Shackelton 1992: 228).
The Single European Act already introduced parliamentary assent to all association agreements,
including the subsequent conclusion of financial protocols. The European Parliament used these
rights in order to put emphasis on its political preferences. Its hesitation to approve the Customs
Union with Turkey can be regarded as an example of this attitude. In recent years the European
Parliament blocked the conclusion of financial protocols with Turkey, Israel, Marocco or Syria in
order to promote human rights (Ibid.: 197f.). 
Furthermore, since Maastricht the assent procedure was extended to all important international
agreements establishing a specific institutional framework, or having important implications for the
Community budget, or requiring the amendment of Community legislation pursuant to the
co-decision procedure (Art. 228 (3) TEC). It also covers other issues such as the creation of a
uniform electoral procedure, adaption of provisions under Union Citizenship residency rights or the
use of structural funds.
However, increased rights and competencies are true for some policy areas within the European
Community, excluding the decision on the coming into force and the shaping of an Economic and
Monetary Union, and of course - regarding the Treaty of Maastricht - of the Second and Third Pillars;
in these cases, EP's role is rather limited and its impact nearly non-existent. On the other hand, it is in
the Second and Third Pillars that Parliament enjoys a judicially fixed right to be informed by the
Council, and its decision to set up a foreign and security affairs committee documents the political
will of the deputies to tackle those issues seriously and to make their voice heard in the European
Union. 
The reforms proposed at the IGC 1996 do not seem to change this basic feature; thus, Parliament will
remain a very unevenly powerful organ in the future.
6
2. System-development
In the case of system developing decisions, the influence of the EP appears as quite limited. The de
facto failure of the Herman Report which should serve as a basis for a European constitution reveals
that a such a solution is not on the agenda of the EP itself at the moment, let alone any federalist
inspired blueprints for a European polity. The draft report was in early 1994 not taken up by the
plenary but referred back to the committee in order to be rediscussed in a broad public debate (Hilf
1994). 
But it should also be remembered that the 1984 Draft Treaty on European Union submitted by the
European Parliament - the so-called Spinelli-Draft - had finally some influence on the debate at that
time; although it was not taken up as a political strategy, it nevertheless inspired the proceedings and
preparations leading to the conclusion of the Single European Act (Archer/Butler 1996: 49), and as
Derek Urwin remarks, "it reconfirmed the EP's role as the conscience of the original EC ideal,
worrying away around the edges of the existing system" (Urwin 1995: 224).
Before, during and after the IGC 1991, Parliament expressed in various resolutions, based upon the
Martin and Colombo reports, its opinion on the process of Treaty revision and made clear what kind
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the pressure exerted by Parliament decisive, but it served as a supporting element to those
governments - like the German or Belgian - and institutions that wished substantial reforms to be
concluded. 
In 1995, the situation is different. The reflection group installed in Messina that prepared the ground
for the IGC 1996 included two members of Parliament, a Christian Democrat and a Socialist. Based
upon reports by Jean-Louis Bourlanges and David Martin, the European Parliament issued a
resolution expressing its assessment of the functioning of the TEU and its basic demands for the IGC
(European Parliament 1995). Afterwards it accompanied the different stages of negotiations on the
revision of Maastricht. Due to French and British pressure, however, no member of Parliament
participates at the conference itself, but a close association, especially by information, is to be
ensured by the governments. In March 1996, the European Parliament confirmed its fundamental
priorities at the IGC (European Parliament 1996). In a clear contrast to the proceedings in 1991, the
preparation of the IGC 1996 reveals considerable progress for the European Parliament. It has, at
least taken a step closer to full integration into the negotiation framework. If the results can be
shaped according to its political intentions, will depend on its bargaining power. Parliament's main
demands refer to the decision-making process: a simplification of procedures by reducing them to
three types: consultation, co-decision and asssent, the second one being the 'normal' decision-making
with qualified majority voting in the Council as a general rule (yet subject to specific exceptions).
The EP thus wants to be recognized as the co-player of the Council with equal rights and influence. 
Two options are available. The EP can either profit from a collaboration strategy with national
parliaments, and it can link different important decisions, wrapping them into a package deal. As an
example of the first option, some member states parliaments - like the Belgian and the Italian - had in
1991 - before Maastricht - declared that they would not accept the results of the IGC for ratification
lest the European Parliamant approved it. This puts pressure on the governments to take the view of
the assembly into account. We could describe this strategy as a transnational coalition of institutions;
regarding the current IGC, the same can be expected. It is not sure at all if the respective national
parliaments would really make come true their menace, but what counts is the effects and
repercussions it creates. Furthermore, the links between the European and national Parliaments will
probably play a more important role in the future (Neunreither 1994).
The second option can be observed at the moment. The European Parliament claims that if the results
of the ongoing IGC are unsatisfactory, the deputies wil refuse to agree to the future enlargement of
the Union (Art. O TEU), thus paralyzing the evolution of the whole system. As any enlargement is
subject to the assent procedure, Parliament in this case enjoys enormous influence; given the fact that
issues of widening and deepening are in many cases closely linked, especially when it comes to
institutional adaptions, Parliament will not have too many problems in convincing the public of its
demands. However, the European Parliament has so far not used its possibilities against major
reforms or constitutional decisions, but rather showed a constructive attitude (Wessels 1995: 893). It
remains to be seen if this is still true with the revision of Maastricht and the following negotiations
on southern and eastern enlargement.
7
3. Interaction
Some innovations introduced by the Maastricht Treaty were designed to bridge the gap between the
citizens and the European Parliament. So, the ombudsman elected according to Art. 138 e TEC was
put in charge of receiving complaints from any citizen or any natural or legal person residing in the
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institutions or bodies other than the court. He or she has the right to conduct inquiries, except where
court cases are under-way (Jacobs/Corbett/ Shackelton 1992: 266). In July 1995, Parliament elected
the Finish politician Jacob Söderman as ombudsman, who in March 1996 presented his first report of
activities; he had so far received 537 complaints of which only 81 had been admitted; most citizens
were not informed about his exact functions and competencies (Schmuck 1995). 
The right to set up a committee of inquiry recently enjoyed widespread public attention in the BSE (
'mad cow') case, when former members of the Commission responsible for Agriculture had to face
the deputies in order to clarify their personal performance and responsibility in that affair.
As regards interaction with the public, the results give little reason for enthusiasm; popular attention
devoted to the EP is low, only rising when elections are held (which, on the other hand, are generally
overshadowed by national issues in the member states). Until recently, there was no or little public
consciousness for the work of the EP, let alone a clear knowledge about its role and function within
the EU (Schmuck 1995). 
One might come to the conclusion that interaction of the EP with the citizens has failed to a large
extent, but one must be careful with hasty conclusions; one way to assess the situation would be to
compare the degree of attention and support shown for the EP with that of respective national
institutions; another one would be to put it into the framework of the EU system as a whole. Only if
marked deviations appear, the performance of the EP could be judged as a special case. 
According to results of Eurobarometer, the European Parliament enjoys the highest awareness levels
among the European population. Perception of the European Parliament by the citizens in the media
was at 63 % in early 1995, as against 52 % in 1994 and 57 % in 1993. Compared to this, the
Commission reached some 59 % in 1995, the Council 47 % and the Court of Justice 45 %
(Eurobarometer 1993; 1995).
In 1995, 56% of the requested persons indicated that they considered the European Parliament as
important; 49 % wished an enhanced role for the Assembly, which marks a quite low level compared
to the last years; the number of those advocating a more important role for Parliament has steadily
decreased from 62 % in 1991 to 48 % in 1994, with a slight increase in 1995 (Ibid.). 
On the other hand, when it comes to the issue of trust in Parliament and in interest-mediation, the
picture gets confused. Only 41% of the citizens declared that they rely on the European Parliament,
and only 35% were convinced that it defended their interests. But here also, comparison is important:
only 45% held trust in their national parliaments (Ibid.).
Furthermore, 47% described themselves as dissatisfied with the way democracy works in the EU
against 41% in favour. But here, the following figure is of interest: More people showed
dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in their home country - 55% against 42 % (Ibid.). 
Public attitude towards the European Parliaments remains fuzzy and not well defined. There is some
kind of lack of orientation that characterizes the results of the opinion polls. On the one hand,
generally an enhanced role of Parliament is desired by the citizens, on the other their degree of
information and trust is quite limited. But what seems important to say is that this attitude affects
more or less to the same extent national institutions. We could see the European Parliament in a
broader current of western political systems.
On the other hand, its increased influence makes Parliament more and more interesting for
intermediary groups including lobbyies, hitherto an almost exclusive domain of the Commission and
national administrations (Wallace 1996: 64; Kohler-Koch 1996). Beate Kohler-Koch and Thomas
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4. A mixed balance
The balance appears generally mixed, hinting at an still existing deficit in the European Union when
parliamentary influence is concerned. It cannot be denied, however, that the EP has grown in
importance - in some fields considerably (especially in policy-making in the First Pillar of the EU
with the exception of the EMU), in others only slightly as constitutive issues or interaction with the
citizens have shown. Archer and Butler describe the changes after Maastricht as "the contrast
between the 'bicephalous' Community political system of the 1960s, and the emerging outlines of a
triumvirate, where power is increasingly shared between Commission, Council and Parliament"
(Archer/Butler 1996: 50). To a growing degree Parliament is assuming the role of an agenda-setter,
i.e. that it determines the political debate and behaviour of other actors ( governments and EU
institutions) to an increasing extent, yet without dominating decision-preparation, making and
implementation. One main weapon of the EP at the moment is public debate, which it can offer in the
plenary and thus create a political forum, providing a better insight to the citizens than secretive
bargaining in the Council or apparently technocratic administration within the Commission. But
Parliament is still far from being a main actor in the game, having perhaps the weakest part of the
institutional triangle with Council and Commission. 
The question furthermore is, how to relate the position of the EP to the question of legitimacy of the
evolving EU. Both aspects are not (any longer) as closely connected as it might have appeared some
years ago.
IV. A new Kind of Parliament for a new Polity - Fusion and
Legitimacy
1. The EU as a new kind of polity
The EU is often thought to be based upon an dual legitimacy, delivered on the on hand by the nation
states and on the other by the directly elected European Parliament. But this distinction does not go
far enough, it needs more refinement (Lodge 1996: 190f.). Concerning the EU and especially the EP,
several dimensions of legitimacy must be taken into account, suitable to be applied to a new kind of
political system. A major force of this system can be characterized as fusion.
It is a major feature of this new kind of political systems in which national, subnational and
supranational actors merge their instruments to 'produce' political decisions (Wessels 1992;
Risse-Kappen 1996). This fusion implies an evolution towards a European democracy. The result is a
'mixed polity', an 'optimal' form of government, which combines several levels of governance and a
wide range of actors, thus creating a complex and highly differentiated entity which can be regarded
as a solution to the problems of the western European welfare and service states (Wessels 1996).
Furthermore, a second feature of this polity must be taken into account: its legitimacy is neither
based on a collective personality called 'the people' - as federalists might argue, nor on the single
peoples of the member states - as in the realist vision - but on a pluralistic 'citizenship'. This
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The principle of representation is increasingly defined in new terms (Andersen/Burns 1996), shifting
away from territorial/ parliamentary to functional self-representation. The fact that each actor -
induding the EP - is constrained and in a certain way controlled by others, and on the other hand
limits the room of manoeuvre of the remaining players of the game, can be seen as generating a form
of procedural and functional checks and balances, in which democratically elected - be it directly or
indirectly - and functional representative institutions and organizations intervene; none of them is
able to enforce their own point of view or to dominate the whole process entirely, but is dependent
upon support, coalition-building and compromise. In the system of the EU, decision-making takes
mainly the shape of decision-negotiation, including elements of convincing others of one's own
positions. Helen Wallace remarks: "Part of the reason for the predominance of negotiation at the core
of the process had to do with the cartel of élites that dominated the negotiating fora and the interests
that lay behind them. That cartel has been 'threatened' by the impact of other forms of policy
influence. These include the imposition of policy through the courts, both ECJ and national, and the
emergence of a form of parliamentarism at the EC level. Irrespective of whether the EP provides
legitimation of European executive decisions, it certainly interferes with the negotiating process. It
can, and sometimes does, overturn the results of negotiation in and around the Commission and the
Council (Wallace 1996: 33).
2. The Role of the EP in the Fusion Process 
The role of the EP in the process of fusion has increased in the fast years. It has, in diverging
intensity, gained grown influence in policy-making, and (more slightly) in system-development.
Given the characteristics of the fusion process, there is a more flexible, but also a more ambivalent
evolution.
Neither the reconstruction of a parliamentary democracy on the supranational level, nor a 'Union of
the States' are models for future orientations. It will be a multi-level system of governance ( Wallace
1996; Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch 1996) in which a direct representative element in the shape of the
EP is having an important say, as part of a European legitimacy complementary to the national and
functional one, but in which the sources and dimensions of legitimacy are progressively getting
merged, so that it will increasingly difficult to define clearly the accountability of a specific actor.
Neither the mentioned virtuous nor the vicious circle can be expected to work in this context; instead,
the development is heading towards a cyclical alternation of both with a general tendency to move
ahead and basically improve the role and position of the European Parliament, i.e. that the virtuous
elements are in the long run making their way, but perhaps not in the sense the federalists had in
mind.
Table 3
All this is highly deviant from experiences accumulated in national political systems. In paradox
terms, it could be labbelled as a new kind of legitimacy without (full) transparency. The citizens
might have to adapt to this peculiarity and must learn to accept it as an inevitable product of
European policy-making not caused by a 'Brussels bureaucracy' but due to the rational interest of
modern welfare and service states. 
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of interdependence and cooperation, thus creating a new kind of political system. Fusion means more
than only a horizontal 'pooling of sovereignties', it implies a merger of public resources from several
state-levels for which the 'outside world', i.e. average citizens, but also many experts cannot trace the
accountability, as responsibilities are diffused. In this context the European Parliament has to define
its role and position.
Desmond Dinan underlines: "Will the democratic deficit ever be rectified? Certainly not simply by
giving more power to the European Parliament, regardless of its failings and foibles...The
Community is a unique system with unique institutions; the solution to the democratic deficit will be
equally novel and unconventional... Undoubtedly the European Parliament will remain an essential
ingredient of political accountability in the European Community. But in an evolving European
Community of traditional or transformed nation-states, the democratic deficit will have to be
resolved by an imaginative blend of public representation and involvement at the regional, national
and Community levels" (Dinan 1994: 292). 
As to the EP, the outlook is not as gloomy as it might appear. It should not claim to be the central
legitimating factor in the EU, but still a highly important one. Its strength lies in providing a public
arena of debate and political discussion, in which different political and social currents and actors can
identify their positions and interests. In this sense, Parliament is and will ever more be a kind of
symbol of this European polity and of its fragmented legitimacy, which is in a constant process of
evolution. Parliaments strive for competencies is a part of this process, where political, constitutional
and ionstitutional questions are mixed and appear linked with each other.
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The European Parliament must try to gain a profile of its own without endangering smooth
decision-making, which is not an easy task and might end up in a dilemma. Even a trade-off can be
described between the political and institutional inportance of the EP - which would require a
constructive stance in decision-making in cooperation with the other institutions, on the one hand,
and a profile of its own as identified by the citizens, which could be blurred by too easily interacting
with its counterparts, on the other hand. There is no easy solution at hand, but dealing with this kind
of dilemmas is and will be the daily work of Parliament and the whole European Union.
If we were to take the fusion process seriously, the 'spill back' to the national level could be
considerable. National Parliaments as traditional channels of legitimation are in a direct and in an
indirect way affected by the described developments. It is not only the legitimacy of the EU that is at
stake, but also that of its member states. This remark does not lead to a simple reinforcement of
traditional - realist and constitutional - claims for "bringing back" national parliaments into EU
affairs, but suggests a more radical analysis: The debate on the European Parliament is just an
indicator of a broader debate on the optiomal size of democracy. If we take the fusion process as a
rational strategy of governments to react and to adapt their state apparatus and functions to both
economic globalization and social claims by their citizens, then there is no easy way back to the
"good old times" of Westminster parliamentarism. We have to think about how to organize a "good
governance" on a larger level. It is like in the 19th century when new forms of representative
government were developed (as described by Bagehot), going far beyond the territorial borders
Aristotle, Montesquieu or Rousseau had considered as appropiate for democracy. We are still in
search of a new concept of legitimacy for a new kind of Parliament. Academic and public debate
might be far behind reality and needs. 
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A federalist view on the EU 
orientation of citizens
support of citizens for integration; EP as the focus
point for citizen's appreciation; shift of loyalties
attribute of the EU system
EU as a democratic and parliamentary
state-like political system; EP as the main
democratic organ
EU policies
growing Europeanization of policies; leading role
of the EP in policy-making
EU institutions
EP as the democratic centre of the EU system;
truly legislative body
material interests
growing interest of the public; EP as important
centre of interest-mediation
symbols, narratives
European constitution; European citizenship;
common values and symbols (flag, anthem)
Table II
An interstate (realist) view on the EU
orientation of the citizens
EU perception mediated through national
orientations; low support; nation states as main
focus of the European peoples
attribute of the EU
union of states; not a european polity; limited
capacity to command assent; only supplementary
legitimacy by the EP
policies
low politics; unspecific and diffuse perception
of EU policies, though with increasing
importance
institutions
European institutions are only oflimited
importance; Council and European Council as
centres of decision-making
material interests
directed towards the national polities and their
institutions
symbols, narrative
actually non-existent; superseded by national
identification
Table III
The Fusion Thesis
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mixed perception; neither strong support nor
rejection; low interest with a high range of
indifferent tolerance
attributes of the EU system
mixed polity with mixed sources of
legitimacy: national and European;
complexity
EU policies
Europeanization; growing importance of EU
policies acompanied by a certain preservation of
national competencies
EU institutions
The EP as one actor among others, however
with a special feature: direct democratic
election; beneath other organs on different
levels; interaction in formal and informal
ways
material interests
wide range of European, national, regional, local
and functional actors with specific interests and
patterns of representation; basically: the rational
interest of modern welfare and service states on
fusion
symbols, narratives
only slightly developing; not a driving force of
a mixed polity, but neither one that will stop
or revert the process 
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